

What Makes a Good Diversity Manager? A Virtue-Based Perspective

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Abstract: The prevalent rule-based perspective on diversity management renders most diversity initiatives more or less uniform, and it therefore also renders the individual(s) in charge of these initiatives replaceable. Against this background, this article argues that an ethical realignment towards a virtue-based perspective, focusing on the diversity manager him- or herself, could help rethink diversity management, and to refashion it into a more impactful shape. The virtue in question is the Aristotelian notion of the virtue of *practical wisdom* (*phrónēsis*). Making their *practical wisdom* a selection criterion for the recruitment process is a first step in the direction of upgrading the concept of diversity management. However, it is also important to adjust their working conditions, the design of their role, as well as their autonomy and performance evaluations in a way that allows them to develop, maintain, and practice this *phrónēsis*.

Key Words: Aristotle, diversity management, diversity manager, *phrónēsis*, practical wisdom

1. Introduction

Beginning in the US in the 1990s, and then spreading to the UK, Canada, and Australia, the practice of ‘diversity management’ has today become a well-established management practice in most Western countries, and not only in the English speaking ones (Klarsfeld 2009, Klarsfeld et al. 2016). In the US, as in some other countries, the emergence of diversity management approaches was a replacement or further development (Kelly and Dobbin 1998, Teicher and Spearitt 1996), (depending on the perspective taken), of the legally demanded affirmative action, positive action, or equal opportunity approaches that were

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previously in place. In other countries, especially in continental Europe, there was no such previous equivalent in place (Stringfellow 2016, Lorbiecki and Jack 2000), until, in 2000, EU council directive 2000/78/EC was enacted, which forced all EU countries to commit to equal treatment in employment and occupation, in terms of certain dimensions of workforce diversity. This gave the diffusion of diversity management an additional stimulus (Toggenburg 2005, Haberl 2016). Although diversity management has added a business perspective to the previous anti-discriminatory initiatives regulated or prompted by law, it still preserves the social justice view of the approaches it has replaced (Danowitz, Hanappi-Egger, and Hofmann 2009, Gilbert, Stead, and Ivancevich 1999). Thus, besides the fact that diversity management is a means of obeying laws, and of maximizing an organization's profitability, those who engage in diversity management are often also motivated by a certain pursuit of justice. This striving attaches an ethical dimension to this management approach (Köllen, Kakkuri-Knuuttila, and Bendl 2018).

This ethical striving, however, is mostly a rule-based striving. Against this background, this article discusses the extent to which a virtue-based perspective might contribute to further developing diversity management, and how it might be able to achieve different results (and maybe better results at that) than those achieved by initiatives nowadays. The focus of this article is on Aristotle's concept of *practical wisdom* (*phrónēsis*) and the potential inherent in this for directing attention towards whether the persons in charge for diversity issues in organizations possess this virtue, and towards whether their working conditions and the structure of the organization allow them to develop, to maintain, and to apply this virtue in their management practice.

In the next section the rule-based character of the diversity management of today is outlined. Subsequently, Aristotelean virtue ethics will be introduced, with a special focus on the virtue of *phrónēsis*. The following section will bring together the Aristotelean approach with the discourse on diversity management, and outline potential connecting points and ways of improving diversity management by taking the development of *practical wisdom* more seriously in diversity management practice.

2. The Rule-Based Nature of Diversity Management

The unjust state that diversity management initiatives aim to address is the unequal distribution of appreciation, resources, power, recognition, autonomy, and/or opportunities amongst the different manifestations of those dimensions of workforce diversity that are considered as being relevant: e.g., between men and

women in terms of gender, between homosexual and heterosexual employees in terms of sexual orientation, etc. (Köllen, Kakkuri-Knuuttila, and Bendl 2018, Dahanayake et al. 2018). A visible result and indicator of this state of inequality is the hierarchical stratification of labour markets by these dimensions, such as gender, nationality, race or sexual orientation (Arce and Segura 2015). These inequalities are often legitimized, and with it stabilized, by prevalent societal stereotypes that are attached to the different manifestations of each dimension (Brescoll 2016, Ndobbo et al. 2018).

Diversity management practice defines, for the most part, a limited number of dimensions of workforce diversity; primarily those which are protected by law, such as gender, race/ethnicity/nationality, sexual orientation, disability-status, age, religion/belief (Edelman, Riggs Fuller, and Mara-Drita 2001). The individuals or the team in charge of managing the organization's workforce diversity would, then, usually identify those manifestations of each dimension of diversity that are disadvantaged and marginalized within the specific organizational context. As a next step, they would typically refer to a given set of diversity management measures (employee resource groups, mentoring, training, awareness building, etc.). These measures mostly aim at either creating opportunities, power, autonomy, etc. on the side of the representatives of the disadvantaged manifestations of the respective dimensions of diversity, or at directly redistributing these categories from the advantaged to the disadvantaged groups (Thomas 1992, Shen et al. 2009, Konrad, Prasad, and Pringle 2005). The 'givenness' of these initiatives is due to what other organizations do in terms of diversity, nationally and globally, to laws and societal expectations, and to the interrelatedness of crucial actors in the field of diversity management (Mor Barak 2016, Ng and Sears 2018).

The above said reveals two crucial rules that allow classifying the current diversity management practice as being rule-based:

The first rule is the apparently unquestioned (and unquestionable) basic assumption within the diversity debate that equality is a value in and of itself, and related to this is the "axiom that inequality is wrong and hence is to be avoided" (van Dijk, van Engen, and Pauwe 2012: 77). In terms of its economic value, van Dijk, van Engen, and van Knippenberg (2012) demonstrate that this value is not a value *per se* but rather depends on the context in which equality is applied, and the tasks to which it is applied. It is this inconclusive economic value inherent in equality and diversity, and the related danger that the business case argument can also easily be utilized against equality, that makes it appealing, and partly necessary, for many voices within the diversity discourse to adhere to the basic

assumption that the moral value of equality (and equity) is, at least, beyond dispute. Representatives of the critical diversity discourse, in particular, often argue based on the assumption that all humans are equal and derive their moral claim for equality in the workplace, implicitly or explicitly, from the concept of human rights (e.g., Noon 2007, Zanoni et al. 2010, Tatli 2011). However, depending on the moral standpoint adopted, this value, and the legitimacy of the concept of human rights, may not in effect be as indisputable as it is often purported to be: for example, when applying a Nietzschean perspective (Köllen 2020).

The second rule is that concerning which dimensions of diversity are regarded as being relevant, and, related to this, which measures may be taken (and be adequate) in terms of these dimensions, in order to make workplaces more inclusive and to enable them to attain a higher degree of equality (or equity). In diversity management research, this ‘givenness’ is often framed in an institutional way as normative, coercive, and mimetic isomorphisms (Yang and Konrad 2011, Süß and Kleiner 2007). These institutional mechanisms of the diffusion of diversity initiatives and goals that are always the same can also be understood as the obedience of rules. These rules inherent to isomorphic processes are dictated by the organizations’ striving for securing legitimacy in society (Pitts et al. 2010, Singh and Point 2009). Against this background, the obedience to these rules is more of a risk-minimizing in terms of others’ expectations. For the specific diversity managers in charge of these processes within the organizations, the adaptation of given initiatives makes their justification towards their supervisors (and the whole workforce in general) easier for them (Kirton and Greene 2009, Evans 2014).

The supervisors of diversity managers are often members of the top management team. Globally, it has become common practice over the last few years for many of these top management teams to define quotas for higher hierarchy levels, or certain areas of work in terms of specific dimensions of diversity (Terjesen and Sealy 2016, Piscopo and Clark Muntean 2018). This stresses even more the rule-following approach of diversity management, in which the measures implemented are understood as instruments to comply with rules, and/or to achieve certain goals. In order to achieve the goal that, in a given number of years, say 40 percent of staff must be women, managers tend to apply only a few similar measures, to use aggregate numbers for monitoring, and to not have the courage to develop new approaches.

One result of this rule-based approach to diversity and its management is that it actually ends up being anything other than comprehensive. Rather, it tends always to look at the same dimensions of workforce diversity, the same

minority groups, and at women, instead of comprehending true diversity in its entirety. However, were one to take a look at the actual situation of segregation in labour markets in Western societies, alongside the dimensions of workforce diversity that have received the most attention, one might think that the last few years of diversity management were really paying mere lip-service towards equality, instead of being an impactful instrument of change (e.g., Bell et al. 2018, Healy and Oikelome 2017). This article argues that it is conceivable that a more virtue-based view of diversity management—and especially of the role of diversity managers—might have more of an impact. Without explicitly focusing on Aristotle, van Dijk and colleagues (2012) have already demonstrated that a focus on employees' virtues can contribute to reducing stereotype-based biases in recruiting and performance measurement (van Dijk, van Engen, and Paauwe 2012). Gotsis and Kortezi (2013) also argue that following a more virtue-based approach in diversity management can “reduce prejudice and attenuate rigid social categorizations” (960).

However, in terms of virtue ethics, the moral philosophy of Aristotle holds a dominant position in business ethics. Ferrero and Sison (2014) show that 45 percent of the 135 business ethics articles on virtue ethics, published between 1980 and 2011 in journals listed in the Journal Citations Report, have used Aristotle as their primary source (Ferrero and Sison 2014: 12). In terms of these articles the authors state: “What characterized Aristotelian ethics mainly was the connection among virtue, practical wisdom, and *eudaimonia* (human flourishing)” (Ferrero and Sison 2014: 12). As a state of happiness, *eudaimonia* is the highest of all goals for both the individual and the community (*polis*). Solomon (1992) was amongst the first to transfer this concept of *eudaimonia* from the *polis* to the organizational (or corporate) level: “Consider, instead, a very different and usually more representative picture of the corporation, the corporation as a wealthy and prosperous ‘*polis*,’ a free and sophisticated city-state with considerable pride in its products, philosophy, and corporate culture” (Solomon 1992: 333). Of course, from an Aristotelian perspective, it is not the monetized market value of such a ‘*polis*’ that is crucial for its *eudaimonia*, but Solomon’s quotation points towards a perspective of understanding managers, (including managers of diversity), as statesmen within an organizational *polis*. As virtuous statesmen they strive to enable, within the *polis* as a whole, the highest possible level of *eudaimonia*. This would also apply to territorial entities, such as cities or regions, that increasingly follow some kind of diversity management approach (see, e.g., Ellerbe-Dück, Schmidt, and Wilpert 2016, Raco 2018, Raco and Kesten 2018).

The Aristotelean virtue of *phrónēsis* and its position within Aristotle's whole system of virtue ethics will now be explained in more detail.

3. Aristotle and *Practical Wisdom*

Aristotle classifies the virtues of soul into the virtues of character (ethical virtues) and the virtues of thought (dianoetic virtues). The virtues of character represent 'means' (relative to the person and the situation in which he or she acts) between two extremes alongside numerous characteristics. In contrast to these virtues, the five virtues of thought (i.e., *skill*, *scientific knowledge*, *practical wisdom*, *wisdom*, and *intellect*) belong to the part of the soul that has reason, and are the means by which the individual can recognize the 'truth.' With *wisdom*, *scientific knowledge*, and *intellect*, "we contemplate those things whose first principles cannot be otherwise, and [with *skill* and *practical wisdom*] those things whose first principles can be otherwise" (Aristotle 2004: 104).

Practical wisdom (*phrónēsis*) holds a very special position in Aristotle's philosophy, and the 'practical truth' (Olfert 2014) is one of five ways of recognizing truth. The practically wise person is capable of gauging "what conduces to living well as a whole" (Aristotle 2004: 107). The subject area of practical wisdom is the alterable singular instance, everything that depends on human actions and decisions, but has not already happened or come into existence. Practical wisdom is a fundamental behavioural basis "concerned with what is good and bad for a human being" (Aristotle 2004: 107). While the virtue of *skill* is not necessarily tied either to a certain way in which this *skill* must be used, or to a certain quality to which the outcome of its usage must correspond, *practical wisdom*, on the other hand, *always* guides its usage in the direction of a morally good purpose, or outcome. Practical wisdom prevents the virtuous individual from utilizing his or her *skills*, *scientific knowledge*, or *intellect* for ethically bad ends, and, furthermore, from solely caring about his or her own "good" life, without any regard for the community (*polis*) in which he or she lives (Gadamer 1998: 12). According to Aristotle, everything that is 'good' for the individual is necessarily 'good' for the community. Thus, it is inconceivable that there could be a 'good' for the individual that would go against the 'good' of the community (Smith 2014). Against this background, it is a crucial characteristic of the practical wise person to consult with others, to understand their perspectives and to consider them in his or her's calculation and practically wise action. "Practical wisdom . . . is concerned with human affairs, namely, with what we can deliberate about. For deliberating well, we say, is the characteristic activity of the practically wise person above all; . . . The person unqualifiedly good at

deliberation is the one who tends to aim, in accordance with his calculation, at the best of the goods for a human being that are achievable in action” (Aristotle 2004: 110).

Practical wisdom is the precondition that enables the individual to navigate the extremes in everyday situations, and to find adequate virtuous means of evaluating these situations, taking decisions, and performing actions for achieving the ‘good.’ This includes knowledge as to what the best outcome of these actions may be (for the individual and, related to this, for the community as a whole) and the desire to reach this state. “The reason must be true and the desire correct, if the rational choice is to be good, and desire must pursue what reason asserts. Such thought and truth are practical” (Aristotle 2004: 104).

Kemmis (2012) summarizes the meaning of the virtue of practical wisdom (*phrónēsis*) as follows:

It is a quality of mind and character and action — the quality that consists in being open to experience and being committed to acting with wisdom and prudence *for the good*. The person who has this virtue has become informed by experience and history and thus has a capacity to think *critically* about a given situation . . . and then to think *practically* about what *should be done* under the circumstances that pertain here and now, in the light of what has gone before, and in the knowledge that one must act (and that even not acting, or not appearing to act, may be the right action). When we have *phrónēsis*, we are thus prepared, for better or for worse, to take moral responsibility for our actions and the consequences that follow from them. The virtue of *phrónēsis* is thus a willingness to stand behind our actions. (Kemmis 2012: 156)

This leads to the question of how a person may develop and maintain his or her *practical wisdom*. For Aristotle, young people are rarely inherently capable of being wholly practically wise, since “practical wisdom is concerned also with particular facts, and particulars come to be known from experience; and a young person is not experienced, since experience takes a long time to produce” (Aristotle 2004: 111). Unlike *scientific knowledge* and *wisdom*, *phrónēsis* cannot be taught, but, rather, must develop through experience. Practical wisdom has an interconnected key position in Aristotle’s classification of virtues, as “we cannot be really good without practical wisdom, or practically wise without virtue of character” (Aristotle 2004: 118). The individual cannot possess *some* of these virtues without others: “he will possess all of them as soon as he acquires the one, practical wisdom” (Aristotle 2004: 118). The practical wisdom “comprises both the practical norms that constitute the *ethos*, and the right line of action for every decision to be made” (Gadamer 1998: 19). *Ethos* means the

“political-practical imprint of life as a whole” (Gadamer 1998: 15). Therefore, there are no potential personal preconditions that might exclude someone from gaining experience, and becoming practically wise. However, conversely, it may then be said, that someone who lacks *any* virtue of character, cannot be practically wise. One cannot be practically wise without the right *ethos*.

In terms of the potential that a focus on Aristotle’s virtue ethics, especially on *phrónēsis*, could have in the further development of diversity management and inclusion, potential connecting and friction points will be discussed further within the next section.

4. *Phrónēsis*, Diversity Management, and the Diversity Manager

In terms of morally praiseworthy conduct in organizations, a perspective inspired by virtue ethics focuses more on the “exercise and development of our moral character (as part of living a fulfilled life) in an organizational context and rel[ies] less on mere compliance of rules” (Vriens, Achterbergh, and Gulpers 2018: 671–672). From an Aristotelian viewpoint, the moral character which guides the conduct of virtuous individuals comprises their virtues of character and their practical wisdom. While the virtues of character are represented by the numerous situation- and person-related ‘means,’ it is only their practical wisdom, their *phrónēsis*, that enables them to discover these virtuous means, which also take into account the impact of their actions upon the organization and the communities in which the organization operates (cf Hartman 2008). Against a backdrop of diversity management, this Aristotelian perspective engenders three crucial questions. First, what would these virtuous ‘means’ look like, in terms of diversity-related organizational issues? What would the related extremes be? Second, how could organizations support their members—and especially their diversity managers—in developing and exercising their moral character, in order to deal with diversity-related issues in a way that is more practically wise. Although the focus of this paper is on diversity managers, adequate structural organizational conditions can, of course, also enable and support other employees, in developing and exercising a practically wise, more inclusive, diversity mindset. And third, what attributes should a diversity manager possess, in order to be capable of accomplishing the tasks demanded by her or his role in a morally wise way? What selection criteria would ideally apply for this position?

4.1. Virtuous “Means” in Diversity Management

In order to deal with a given situation in an organizational setting in a morally wise way, Vriens, Achterbergh, and Gulpers (2018) confirm that the necessary

preconditions for virtuous acting are “seeing the ‘mean’ on the moral dimension related to the situation [and] desiring the ‘mean’ on the moral dimension related to the situation for its own sake” (675). Of course, being capable of identifying such ‘means’ and having the personal moral propensity to strive for them, is largely dependent on the moral character of the individual actor, a character, whose development and exercise can be facilitated—but not guaranteed—by adequate organizational conditions (as will be shown in the next section). Such ‘means’ always derive from the given, specific situation, and the judgements of specific virtuous individuals. In terms of diversity management and organizational issues related to diversity and inclusion, it is therefore not possible to pre-define such means in a rule-based manner. However, it is possible to reflect upon some extremes, between which these means might be positioned.

One mean that a practically wise diversity management would have to address is that concerning the legitimacy of diversity management, and, with it, internal and external communication about its legitimacy. The two extremes in this case focus either on its moral or its economic legitimacy. In diversity management practice, the emphasis is by and large on the business case of having a diverse workforce and/or managing it in an appropriate way. The moral value of this striving is mostly presented as an appreciated bonus feature of diversity management. While the business case narrative might be more appealing for the owners or shareholders of an organization (or any other group that holds a financial stake in it), for the general public (as well as for employees), the moral considerations might be more appealing (Köllen 2021). Although open to dispute, the moral justification for diversity management is largely rooted in the basic assumption that diversity management represents a striving for equality or equity, and that the concepts of equity and equality describe ‘just’ states, which are morally good in and of themselves (Köllen 2020). A virtuous mean in legitimizing diversity management will probably take into account both legitimizing ways, and, perhaps, offer additional or alternative ways for each legitimizing direction.

No matter what the legitimizing rationale behind this is, a crucial task for diversity managers is to reduce diversity-based exclusion, hierarchization and stigmatization within the workforce, (assuming that the position has not been created as a mere cypher or metaphorical ‘fig-leaf’). Members of societally underprivileged groups should not, at least within the organization, be treated as such, and this would entail a certain awareness of widely shared stereotype profiles and a certain willingness to overcome them. Of course, diversity management has to take into account and understand the perspectives of members

of societally disadvantaged groups within the workforce or within the pool of job candidates. However, there exist also the various perspectives of the members of the advantaged groups, which should be recognized when developing diversity initiatives. Diversity management, or the diversity manager, should avoid merely unthinkingly perceiving every opponent or critic of given diversity initiatives as sexist, racist, homophobic, or whatever morally stigmatizing terminology exists with regard to the respective dimension of workforce diversity. Depending on the diversity management approach chosen, one must address the question as to whether advantaging or disadvantaging certain employees or job candidates merely on account of their group memberships or demographics is really justified and just (Köllen, Kakkuri-Knuuttila, and Bendl 2018). One must then address the question of whether potential reverse discrimination (e.g., by quota systems or by restricting access to certain resources to a specific group membership) is indeed justified on the grounds of the discrimination that other members of the same disadvantaged groups have experienced in the past (Boxill 1972, Sher 1975). A virtuous mean will probably integrate both perspectives, and, in doing so, avoid deepening lines of demarcation between (formerly) societally privileged and under-privileged groups within the workforce.

Another important mean in terms of organizational diversity issues is that between, on the one hand, considering only organizational interests and the flourishing of the organization, and, on the other hand, considering primarily the flourishing and wellbeing of the community of which the organization is a part. Several studies have already demonstrated that besides striving for its own stability and flourishing, an organization can, of course, also contribute to the good of the community within which it operates, no matter whether this community is defined on a global scale as humanity as a whole, or whether the organization focuses more on the good of a community of the region or territory in which it pursues its principal business (e.g., Breen 2012, Sison and Fontrodona 2015). Against this backdrop, the flourishing and wellbeing of employees can be integrated into the community perspective, since they belong to the broader community in which the organization operates, as well as being members of that organization (Solomon 2004). However, as the wellbeing of the workforce, the organization, and the community are not perforce in opposition, but are rather interrelated in many ways, virtuous means are not always bound to be too far from the extremes. In terms of organizational diversity management and the role of the diversity manager, it could, for example, be a contribution towards the well-being and flourishing of a community, to serve as a positive role-model for the inclusion of diversity. Depending on the standing the organization has

in terms of public opinion, this can be a potent contribution, which might encourage others, including the diverse administrative units of the communities, to follow suit. Related to this is the fact that organizational provision of a more inclusive working climate for employees might encourage those employees to reflect and export this climate into the community also, and, with this, contribute to the wellbeing of the community. However, as these micro-, meso-, and macro-levels are strongly interrelated, practically wise diversity managers might discover numerous possible and adequate means of dealing with these connected issues. Naturally, the organization is the entity that pays the manager; therefore, the well-being and flourishing of the organization should not, for the manager, be wholly excluded as a concern. However, how precisely organizations can support their diversity manager, in developing and exercising their practical wisdom—the precondition for deriving the above ‘means’—will be discussed below.

4.2. Structural Conditions that Support the Development and Exercise of the Diversity Manager’s Practical Wisdom

Several articles have already discussed those structural elements of organizations which either support or impede the individual’s development and the exercising of a moral character from a virtue perspective. Jos (1988), for example, points to the danger that the bureaucratic structure of modern organizations might “erode the individual’s capacity for independent thinking and decision making [and jeopardize] the worker’s autonomy, his status as a chooser” (323). Related to this is the danger of undermining the capacity of employees for “morally autonomous judgement and action” (Jos 1988: 343). As this autonomy is a precondition for practically wise balancing and acting, it is important to consider ways of reinforcing autonomy, rather than making employees obedient and functional organizational ‘soldiers,’ devoid of opinion, and controlled within rigid corporate hierarchies. Breen proposes the concept of “phronetic work” and the “ideal of phronetic production” (Breen 2012: 619) as some kind of meaningful and non-alienating work, where “one devotes oneself not to the execution of a limited number of tasks, but instead to the performance of a ‘complex’ set of interrelated tasks in a ‘coherent’ fashion” (Breen 2012: 621) in a cooperative manner, without strict hierarchies. Beadle and Knight (2012) show that it is primarily experiencing one’s job as meaningful which supports exercise of a moral character. Schwartz (2011) argues that organizations diminish their employees’ practical wisdom primarily by establishing detailed rules and by provision of excessive incentives. Both ways of ‘managing’ employees undermine their

autonomy and erode their *phrónēsis*. Vriens, Achterbergh, and Gulpers (2018) summarize the literature on supportive organizational conditions and find that it is primarily “the way jobs are defined, related, and coordinated” (672) that can foster or hinder employees, in terms of exercising and developing their moral character, in the context of doing their jobs. The jobs should be designed as being “rich” with “low levels of specialization, separation and formalization” (688) within semiautonomous teams, where employees can easily talk with each other about their activities.

In terms of a supportive organizational structure for diversity managers it can, therefore, be assumed that both autonomy and the possibility to permanently exchange views and ideas with colleagues are the most important conditions for the development, maintenance, and exercising of *phrónēsis*. It is crucial to design the job of the diversity manager in such a way that allows him or her to gather experiences. These experiences include those lived by others, and learned from them by proxy, as it were, through dialogue (see, e.g., Senge 2006, Isaacs 1999). An organization can respond to this by establishing working conditions that allow the diversity manager to gain these experiences. This could, for example, be enabled by allowing the diversity manager to get to know the organization—and the people within this organization—better. The manager could, for example, spend two days a week getting to know different departments, locations, workplaces, and, of course, employees. If their work allows it, employees should then be officially encouraged to speak with the diversity manager during their working time.

Practical wisdom requires practice, in order to develop this wisdom further. Therefore, the diversity manager needs a certain degree of autonomy, and the permission to really action diversity projects. As a possible means of responding to this need, the organization could allow the diversity manager the freedom to action projects without having to go through official channels further up the hierarchy, or at least make this the case for initiatives of certain sizes and kinds.

Schwartz’s (2011) findings about the negative impact of detailed rules and incentives point to another important issue: the performance measurement of the diversity manager’s work. Bigger companies, especially, have a disposition to try to measure every manager’s success, and to remunerate when managers exceed predefined targets. As this massively impinges upon the manager’s scope to calculate alternative targets, to think in longer timespans, and—depending on the nature of the targets—to develop alternative diversity initiatives, organizations should exempt diversity managers from their practices of defining specific objectives. The manager cannot infringe upon the necessity or the willingness

of the organization to perform as well as possible (no matter whether this is measured in financial terms or otherwise), but it should be left to the manager him- or herself as to how to integrate this into his or her calculations. An example that can often be seen in diversity practice is the seeming need of many diversity managers to speak publicly about their diversity approaches, and to present them, and their organizations, as exceptional and praiseworthy. The mere public relations part of these activities is of little avail in terms of the organization's diversity program itself. In order to develop diversity initiatives further in a practically wise way, such events should take the shape of a dialogical exchange. However, such an exchange would have to include the potential to openly address experiences with ambiguities, uncertainties, setbacks, and any resistance encountered by one's diversity management. As openness of this kind would contravene the intention of many organizations to present an image of themselves as being successful pioneers (without any acknowledgement of stumbling blocks, problems, or limitations), such dialogical exchanges with people from outside the organization would probably remain closed to the public.

The notion of experiencing one's job as meaningful, raised by Beadle and Knight (2012) should not, at least with regard to the topic with which the job is concerned, be a significant issue for diversity managers. As diversity issues are always closely related to identity issues, it should be obvious how meaningful this would be for most employees. Thus, having the opportunity to act in a positive way in this area should be easily perceivable as being meaningful. Beyond the topic with which the job is directly concerned, experiencing one's actions as meaningful, can be supported by—as outlined above—the granting of sufficient autonomy, and the avoidance of too many restrictive targets.

There is no clear consensus as to how exactly the state of *eudaimonia*—for which *phrónēsis* is a necessary pre-condition—would look (Heinaman 1988, Whiting 1988). However, on the individual level, it would be considerably more connected to the wellbeing of the community in which the individual was living, or with whom the individual was working (Dierksmeier and Pirson 2009), and growth, as an end in itself, or the mere accumulation of wealth do not define this state (Bragues 2006, Finley 1970). It would be, rather, a moderation between extremes, where everyone has 'enough.' For diversity-related issues in the workplace, or within organizations in general, the central point would be that diverse people have diverse needs, desires, capabilities and perspectives, no matter whether they are due to social stereotyping and related facilitations and barriers, or to differences that are inherent to the different manifestations of the numerous diversity categories as such. Another crucial issue for enabling

practical wisdom to be exercised through the position of the diversity manager, or the person in charge of diversity-related issues, is the selection of the individuals for these positions.

4.3. The Selection of Diversity Managers

Persons in charge of organizational diversity issues may either be employed specifically for working exclusively on diversity issues, or, as is increasingly the case, receive a diversity agenda as an addendum, as it were, to those they already have, which are typically human resource management agendas. Which of these is the case, though, makes no difference, in terms of developing criteria for their selection from an Aristotelian perspective.

In order to possess, or to be capable of developing *phrónēsis*, a crucial criterion they have to meet is that they must have experience in the field of diversity. This experience need not necessarily be related to previous experience of similar positions, but rather active experience with diversity as such. Ideally, this is related to the experience of diverse perspectives of diverse people, no matter whether one has gained them through the narratives of others, or experienced them oneself. One's CV might give a first hint (although this can also be misleading) as to whether one had, indeed, firsthand experiences of such diversity, especially of manifestations of diversity that one does not represent in oneself. In any case, the crucial thing is that the candidate be open to having these experiences in the future.

As consulting with others, and the understanding and integration of their perspectives and experiences is a core element in practically wise decision making, diversity managers need to be capable of dialogical communication (Isotalus and Kakkuri-Knuuttila 2018). These dialogical skills are different from the rhetorical skills that are often instilled in management schools; rather, they embody the capability of empathizing with others in a non-judgemental way.

Although there is some knowledge about diversity available which can be learned, mere knowledge about, say, certain mechanisms of exclusion within organization for minority groups or women (as an example), would belong instead to the virtue of *skill*. In fact, for diversity managers this knowledge can be helpful. However, possessing this *skill* does not say anything about the purposes for which this *skill* is used. A manager who possesses this knowledge could use this knowledge for his or her own professional progress, or in order to remove colleagues that stand in the way of her or his promotion, say. The development and maintenance of *practical wisdom* implies the maintenance of one's desire and willingness (i.e., *ethos*) to strive for 'the good.' This personal habitus is in

permanent danger of being undermined by one's potentially volatile passions or emotions. These emotions might, for example, move the individual to leave the path of striving for the 'right' means of action merely because, for example, he or she has been treated unjustly him- or herself. In terms of the practically wise diversity manager, this means that he or she should be an emotionally very stable person. This is of particular importance as diversity managers have to deal with identity categories (such as nationality, gender, sexual orientation, etc.) that for many people may be crucial for attaching sense and meaning to themselves (Lau and Murnighan 1998, Holck, Muhr, and Villesèche 2016). Therefore, the belongingness to a certain gender, nationality, etc., in combination with the maintenance of a positive attribution to these categories, can be a source of emotional stability in itself. As this is also valid for the diversity manager him- or herself, the common practice of preferentially employing managers from underprivileged or disadvantaged groups is a double-edged sword. Van Dijk, van Engen, and Paauwe (2012) clearly argue that "the heart of a virtue ethics perspective on managing diversity lies in identifying and denoting those qualities that are considered pivotal to a job role or function, [which for the role of the diversity manager] bears the important implication that other personal characteristics (including age, gender and ethnicity) are relevant only inasmuch they are undisputedly related to those qualities" (74). Employing members of societally underprivileged groups, primarily women and minorities, as diversity managers, might be one of the disputable cases. On the one hand, they might have experienced more diversity-related issues in their lives and in their surroundings as members of advantaged groups who often see their privileged experiences as normal, and therefore do not relate them to diversity. On the other hand, however, their experience of marginalization or discrimination might make members of disadvantaged groups much more prone to developing some kind of 'resentment-based rage' (Sloterdijk 2010) against members of the advantaged groups, which would then undermine their *ethos* and, subsequently, their *practical wisdom*. It must be ensured that diversity managers are not guided by any kind of 'emotional scar,' resentment, hate, rage, or compensatory desire, due to their own experiences. Exploring the potential diversity manager's motivation for doing his or her job can give a first hint as to his or her's ability to cope with personal emotional scars, and the presence of resentments. The candidate's CV could give a first hint as to his or her virtuousness, in terms of virtues of character. As a practically wise person has to possess all of them, then, conversely, the absence of *one* of them means the certain absence of *practical wisdom*.

5. Conclusion

Aristotle might not be one of the first philosophers that would occur to anyone thinking about diversity management, especially given the differences he perceives between men and women (Borden Sharkey 2016, Levy 2009), and his justification of slavery (Heath 2008, Millett 2007). This article has, however shown, how an Aristotelian view of diversity management, with a clear focus on the practical wisdom of diversity managers, might open up alternative ways of shaping this management practice.

As this article focuses explicitly on the position of the diversity manager, and not on that of the organization as a whole, it might very well be that, when the person of the diversity manager changes, the newly employed individual might partially undo initiatives that their predecessor has implemented. This focus, therefore, does not perforce guarantee continuity in terms of the specific shape of organizational diversity management initiatives. However, if the new managers are provided with the same moral character, and with the same organizational conditions and structure that allow them, too, to develop and exercise their *phrónēsis*, this should in no way prove a problem. In fact, quite the contrary: new practically wise individuals could bring new perspectives to the organization, which might contribute to developing the diversity management program further. However, it remains important for all diversity managers that their positions are provided with sufficient autonomy and authority, so that their initiatives may not easily be undone by other managers, who may stand in opposition to their striving because of other, less virtuous, reasons.

It might be that for many bigger organizations, which have already implemented some sort of diversity management, a rearrangement of their approach in such an Aristotelian way would appear as too far and too risky a step. Of course, a virtue-based approach needs more trust to be placed in the figure of the diversity manager than does a rule-based one. However, for such organizations, it might prove a good starting point to define a certain sub-area of their diversity-approach, and to entrust responsibility for this to a person, or to a group of persons, who are chosen and treated in such a way that they are allowed to deal with this responsibility in a way that is *practically wise*. In this way, the organization can gain some experiences of this approach, and decide later whether this approach might be extended or not. For small and medium-sized companies, which have not yet started to follow some kind of diversity management, the Aristotelian way appears to be a good starting point. This may particularly be the case when they are family-owned, since they may have more scope to try out new and innovative approaches, since they are not in the public eye to the extent

that, say, a multinational company might be, and they are therefore also not so prone to institutional constraints. It might then be the case that it is precisely from these types of smaller organizations that fresh new ideas can emerge, in terms of managing an organization's diverse workforce, and these ideas might then be seized upon by larger organizations, which have already established rule-based diversity initiatives.

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